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RESUMO
O artigo apresenta as principais questões acerca dos chamados “defi nidos fracos”, os exemplos 
que motivaram sua investigação, bem como a diversidade de exemplos e de teorias para 
explicá-los. Discorre sobre as soluções para os “defi nidos fracos”, seus limites e a possibilidade 
(ou necessidade) de unifi cação. Além disso, introduz os trabalhos apresentados no encontro 
(Florianópolis, 20 e 21 de agosto, 2012.) “Weak (In)Defi niteness and Referentiality” e 
que foram incluídos neste volume temático, mostrando como eles se relacionam com o tema da 
defi nitude fraca.
ABSTRACT
The paper discusses the main issues concerning the so called “weak defi nites”, presents the 
examples that motivated their investigation, as well as the diversity of  theoretical approaches 
formulated to explain it. It introduces the solutions to the weak defi nites, their limits and 
the possibility of  a unifi ed account. It is also an introduction to the papers included in this 
thematic issue some of  which were debated during the conference “Weak (In)Defi niteness and 
Referentiality” (Florianópolis, August 20 and 21, 2012). 
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Introduction
One of  the topics of  the international cooperation project CAPES-
COFECUB entitled “Bare Nouns in Brazilian Portuguese: the syntax-
semantics interface”1, coordinated by professor Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin 
in France and Roberta Pires de Oliveira in Brazil, is the distinction defi nite 
versus indefi nite and its relation to bare noun phrases. The conference 
“Weak (In)Defi niteness and Referentiality”, held in Florianópolis, 
SC, Brazil, in August 20 and 21, was a way of  achieving a better 
understanding of  the relations between (in)defi niteness, referentiality 
and the interpretation of  noun phrases. The conference was preceded by 
three mini-courses, all of  which were directly linked to the main topic of  
the conference: Gregory Carlson talked about generics, Claire Beyssade 
discussed the solutions to weak defi nites, and Pascal Amsili lectured on 
presuppositions.2 
Most of  the papers in this special issue of  Revista da ABRALIN 
were selected from the presentations during the Conference. Carlson 
et al, Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts, and Beyssade’s papers were written 
in English for this journal, with the purpose of  introducing the main 
theoretical trends. Since they will be published also in a special issue 
of  Recherches Linguistique de Vincennes, organized by Claire Beyssade and 
Roberta Pires de Oliveira, in this volume we publish their Portuguese 
translations. 
The theme of  the conference, around which all the papers 
gravitate, is the idea of  weak referentiality. Poesio (1994) was the fi rst 
to identify a class of  examples of  defi nite descriptions, which he called 
“weak defi nite”, characterized by the absence of  uniqueness; lacking, 
therefore, the hallmark characteristic of  the defi nite phrase headed by 
the defi nite article. Other authors found different types of  examples, 
1 Project number 647-09. We would like to thank CAPES for supporting all our activities. 
2 The conference and the mini-courses were possible due to the fi nancial support from CAPES, 
to which we are very grateful. CAPES PAEP 741/2012. 
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rising at least two intermingled issues: do weak defi nites differ from 
“normal” defi nite phrases?; can all the examples of  weak defi niteness be 
unifi ed, or are we dealing with heterogeneous phenomena? There is no 
consensus about either. In the fi rst section, we introduce the examples 
that have being labeled “weak defi nite” so far. In the second section, we 
briefl y summarize some of  the most important solutions: the relational 
view, and the indefi nite defi nite proposal, which groups two distinct 
approaches the pseudo-incorporation view, which appear in Carlson et 
al’s paper in this volume, and the kind solution, presented in Aguilar & 
Zwarts’ paper also in this volume. We briefl y discuss two approaches 
the aim of  which is a unifi ed theory, one of  which is Claire Beyssade’s 
proposal, one of  the authors in this dossier. The third section briefl y 
shows how the papers in this volume are linked to the theme of  weak 
referentiality. In the conclusion, we balance the possibility of  a unifi ed 
theoretical approach.
1 Weak Defi nites
The content of  the defi nite article is one of  the greatest themes 
in semantics. Classically, there are two approaches: the quantifi cational 
and the presuppositional views represented by Russell (1905) and Frege 
(1892) respectively, the fathers of  modern logic. According to Russell 
the defi nite article does not denote an individual, but it is a quantifi er. 
Thus, the nominal phrases in sentences in (1) are of  the same semantic 
type, though they differ with respect to their contents:
(1) a.  The book is on the table.
b.  A book is on the table.
Without going into the details, in Russell’s account, (1.a) states that 
there is one and just one book that is on the table; whereas in (1.b) 
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the existential quantifi cation asserts that there is at least one book 
on the table. In Frege’s view, only (1.a) carries a presupposition – the 
presupposition that there is one and just one book –, and the nominal 
phrase is of  type <e>, i.e. it denotes an individual – that particular 
book –, whereas in (1.b), the nominal phrase is quantifi cational, and 
the sentence receives the same treatment as in Russell. Be it one way or 
another, in both classical approaches, the defi nite article conveys (either 
semantically or pragmatically) that there is a unique referent that satisfi es 
the defi nite noun phrase. Both theories need some sort of  domain 
restriction to single out the referent. 
An alternative analysis was proposed by Heim in her 1982 dissertation. 
In Heim’s theory the defi nite and the indefi nite noun phrases are 
semantically equivalent since both introduce free variables. They differ 
with respect to the role they play in the discourse: indefi nites introduce 
individuals into the discourse – in her terms, they open a new fi le card – 
whereas the defi nite recovers a referent in a fi le card that is already in the 
common ground, i.e. it is familiar. Thus, the defi nite phrase presupposes 
the referent of  the defi nite phrase – i.e. it presupposes that there is a 
book in example (1.a) – and is an instruction for the hearer to fi nd the 
fi le that matches the index. The notion of  uniqueness is, then, derived 
by the fact that in order to interpret a defi nite phrase, the hearer must 
identify one particular fi le card.3
Poesio (1994) was the fi rst to introduce a series of  examples that 
challenges the view that the defi nite article conveys uniqueness; he 
labeled this class of  examples “Weak Defi nites”. Carlson & Sussman 
(2005) and Carlson et alii (2006) introduced another type of  examples, 
which they called “weak defi nite” or “indefi nite defi nite”, and other 
authors came up with other examples, in particular Barker (2005), and 
Lyons (1999). We review some of  these examples in the next sections. 
3 For a recent review of  the semantics and pragmatics of  defi nite and indefi nite noun phrase 
see Heim (2011).
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1.1 The relational weak defi nite
Below are Poesio 1994’s examples:
(2) a. John got the data from the student of  a linguist.
 b.  The village is located on the side of  a mountain.
 c. I usually have breakfast at the corner of  an intersection.
Two points should be stressed with respect to the sentences in (2): 
(i) all the defi nite phrases in (2) have the same structure – the head noun 
is a relational noun and the complement is an indefi nite phrase –, this is 
an essential element in Poesio’s theoretical account; (ii) there is no way 
of  retrieving a unique referent appealing to some sort of  contextual 
function (domain restriction will not work here). One can felicitously 
utter (2.b) even if  it is not familiar to the speaker and the hearer on 
which side of  the mountain the village is. An intersection normally has 
four corners, and there is no need for the speaker to know in which 
corner he has breakfast. Weak defi nites can be used in a situation in 
which neither the speaker nor the listener has any previous acquaintance 
with a specifi c intersection or corner, neither is there an implication that 
the intersection in question has only one corner.
One could imagine that (2.a) is solved by some sort of  function 
which selects the salient individual in the context or from a given set, and 
uniqueness would then be rescued. Donazzan, in this volume, assumes 
this solution. Although her paper is mainly devoted to examples similar 
to those raised by Carlson & Sussman (2005) and Carlson et al (2006), 
she discusses the case of  a teacher who sends one of  her pupils to the 
corner of  a classroom, and claims that there is a particular corner which 
may be contextually recovered. This is certainly the case, but then it is no 
longer an example of  weak defi nite. If  the weak defi nite were solved by 
recovering a particular individual via some function, then the sentence 
in (2.a) should be synonymous of:
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(3) John got the data from the student who studies with a linguist.
But (3) is not synonymous of  (2.a). The reading Poesio has in mind 
for (2.a) can be paraphrased as: there is a linguist, and there is a student 
of  that linguist, such that John got the data from that student. Essentially, 
neither the speaker nor the hearer has to identify a particular individual 
in order to interpret the sentence. This meaning is just not available for 
(3). Thus, it seems that weak defi nites, according to Poesio’s seminal 
paper, are not to be related to with any sort of  domain restriction. 
The class of  examples in (2) not only defi es the idea of  uniqueness 
which seems to characterize the defi nite determiner phrase, but also 
calls into discussion the famous generalization about there-sentences, 
fi rst mentioned by Milsark (1977), and which is taken to be a test for 
defi niteness, as shown in Lee’s paper in this volume. Milsark argues that 
there is a contrast between strong noun phrases and weak ones: only the 
latter can appear in there-sentences, as shown below:
(4) a. There is a student in the garden.
b. * There is the student in the garden.
Strong determiners presuppose the set denoted by the noun – 
student in (4.a) – whereas weak determiners introduce individuals into 
the discourse. Poesio shows that his examples in (2) do not show the 
same behavior as the defi nite phrase, since in contrast to (4.b), the 
example in (5) seems to be natural in there constructions:
(5) There is the student of  a linguist in the garden. 
Being acceptable in there-constructions may be taken as a diagnostic 
that the weak defi nite is in fact an indefi nite. However, this does not 
seem to be the case, since (2.a) does not convey the same information 
as (6):
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(6) John got the data from a student of  a linguist. 
Thus, neither defi nite nor indefi nite, what is this phrase?
1.2 Indefi nite defi nite
Carlson & Sussman (2005) and Carlson et alii (2006) introduced a 
different type of  weak defi nite or indefi nite defi nite, exemplifi ed below. 
This class of  examples cannot be in there-constructions, as shown in (8):
(7) a. Mary went to the store.
 b. Open the window.
 c. I took the train to come here.
(8) *There is the store Mary went.
The main characteristic of  the defi nite phrases in (7) is the fact that 
they do not presuppose uniqueness or familiarity, as can be seen from 
the ellipsis test. Compare (9.a) and (9.b):
(9) a. Mary went to the store, and Bill did, too.
 b. Mary went to the desk, and Bill did, too.
Only (9.a) shows a sloppy reading, according to which Mary has 
gone to “Stop and Shop” and Bill, to “Target”, for example. In (9.b), they 
both have to go to the same desk. This pair of  examples shows another 
property of  this type of  weak defi nite: they are lexically restricted. This 
is not the case with Poesio’s relational weak defi nites, where the structure 
must be fi xed, but not the lexical items. Indefi nite defi nites give rise to 
“enriched meanings”: to go to the store is to go shopping. Moreover, they 
cannot be modifi ed as shown in (10): 
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(10) Mary went to the new store, and Bill did, too.
In sentence (10), Mary and Bill must have gone to the same store, 
only a strict reading is possible. Modifi cation is possible, as shown by 
Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts (2011) if  the modifi er maintains, according 
to their analysis, a kind denotation – both (11.a) and (11.b) have a weak 
reading, where John was internee for medical treatment:
(11) a. John is in the hospital.
 b. John is in the psychiatric hospital.
 
Carlson et alii (2006) explicitly claim that “in a given event expressed 
by a weak defi nite, there is not necessarily any unique object picked out.” 
Their main argument concerns example (7.c): the speaker may have 
taken different trains in her journey, she may have changed trains many 
times, and this situation can still be truthfully described by (7.c). Thus, 
there is no need of  a unique referent, nor have the interlocutors to be 
familiar with some referent. 
1.3 Other types of  weak defi nite
Barker (2005) generalized Poesio’s examples to possessive 
constructions, including examples such as:
(12) The child held the fi nger of  the surgeon.
Though Barker proposes that there is just one defi nite article the, he 
claims that the whole defi nite construction in (12) does not presuppose 
uniqueness. The sentence in (12) does not imply that the surgeon has 
just one fi nger, nor is it necessary that there is one fi nger salient in 
the situation for (12) to be felicitous. Notice that the structure in the 
examples in (2) has an indefi nite article in the second noun, whereas in 
(12) the article is defi nite in both occurrences.
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Barker stresses Poesio’s remark that weak defi nites are very natural 
in there constructions. If  being natural in there construction is a property 
of  weak defi nite, then Lyons (1999) rightly points out the existence of  
another type of  weak defi nite, which he calls “extremely reading” use, 
exemplifi ed in (13):
(13) There is the most intriguing girl in the garden. 
 (Lyons 1999: 247)
Zielke’s paper in this volume studies the extremely reading case in 
three languages, Turkish, German and Spanish.
Table 1 compares these different types of  examples called weak 
defi nite in literature with respect to their defi ning properties:
TABLE 1
Relational indefi nites extremely
There-construction  No 
Fixed structure  No 
Semantic enrichment No  no
Lexically restricted No  no
Allow modifi cation  No* 
Lack of  presupposition 
of  uniqueness   no
Genitive DP  No no
Sloppy reading   no
* 4
The fi rst question that comes to mind is: aren’t we dealing with 
heterogeneous phenomena? Is a unifi ed theory possible?
4 Except from the kind modifi cation exemplifi ed in (11).
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2 Solutions
Carlson et alii (2006) explicitly state that their theoretical account 
covers only the indefi nite defi nite; Poesio (2004) and Barker (2005) 
claim that their approaches are explanations only for the relational 
or possessive defi nite. However, some authors have claimed that a 
unifi ed theory is possible, among them Beyssade (in this volume), 
and Corblin (in press). In the fi rst section, we briefl y review Poesio’s 
and Barker’s solutions to the relational defi nite. The second section 
contrasts Carlson et alii (2006) and Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts’ 
(2011) approaches to the indefi nite defi nite. Finally, in the last 
section, sketches of  unifi ed theories are presented. The aim is not 
to present a full account of  each proposal, but to enumerate them 
and to evaluate the possibility of  a unifi ed treatment for the weak 
defi nites.
2.1 Relational nouns
Though Barker (2005) extends Poesio’s examples of  the relational 
defi nite, which he renames as possessive defi nite, their theoretical 
explanation for the phenomenon is not exactly the same, even though 
both reject the ambiguity solution – according to which there are two 
defi nite determiners the –, and both rely on the fact that of introduces a 
relation. Thus, their solutions require a possessive structure.
Without going into the details of  the implementation, Poesio’ 
solution relies on De Jong (1987) and Zucchi (1993) insight that 
presuppositional noun phrases are barred from there-constructions. In 
his approach, presuppositions are rendered as contextual variables or 
parameters. Thus, the student in (4.b) has a parameter that must be set by 
the context, and this is the reason why it is blocked from a there sentence. 
Parameters may be set by the context or they may be anchored; if  they 
are anchored, then they receive a value from some fi le card index, and 
the contextual variable is replaced by a constant: “an anchored parameter 
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can be replaced by its non-parametric value” (2004: 291). Anchoring the 
parameter may only happen when we have a relational noun. When the 
contextual parameter is anchored, the presupposition of  uniqueness (or 
familiarity) is cancelled. 
Here is a sketch of  how this solution works. First, of has to be a 
lexical possessive, i.e. it requires an argument, thus it is relational. This 
is crucial. In (14), the weak reading is not available because of is not 
lexically a possessive:
(14) ??I don’t want to steal the book of  a library (294, example 37)
Thus, the student in (2.a) is a relational noun and is interpreted 
as student (x, D), where D is a parameter. In (2.a), this parameter is 
anchored since it is equated to the variable in the predicate linguist, 
which is a sortal noun – linguist (y). Replacing D by y, results in 
student (x, y), which cancels the presupposition and allows the 
combination with there. This is not the case with (3), because student 
is not relational in this example and the parameter must be set by 
the context. Thus, we expect that this defi nite phrase cannot be in 
there-construction, as it seems to be the case:
(15) *There is the student who studies with a linguist in the garden.
Weak defi nites need relational nouns. Poesio notices that this is also 
true for cases of  bridging or associative defi nites.5 
Barker has a different explanation which relies on two different 
ways of  composing the relational defi nite. He associates the uniqueness 
presupposition to the fi rst semantic component in the semantic 
derivation, and proposes two derivations for the defi nite phrase:
5 According to some authors, e.g. Corblin (in press), associative anaphoras constitute another 
type of  weak defi nite, since there is not presupposition of  familiarity, nor the need of  a particular 
individual in the context to be the value of  the defi nite description:
(i) We went to a wedding last Sunday. The bride wore red.
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(16) a. the (corner (of-the-intersection))
 b. (the · corner) (of-the-intersection)
(16.a) derives the strong reading according to which there is one 
and only one particular corner of  the intersection. In (16.b), the defi nite 
determiner preserves uniqueness, not of  an individual, but of  the relation 
between corners and the intersection. A successful use of  a possessive 
defi nite description, then, is one that provides enough information for 
the listener to reliably pick out the intended kind of  object: it’s about 
the corner of  the intersection the speaker is talking about, not the road 
junction. In other words, “what the speaker has in mind is a unique, 
specifi c relation, and that specifi city is what the defi nite determiner is 
marking.” (Barker, 2005: 110).
None of  these analysis can describe the indefi nite defi nite.
2.2 Indefi nite defi nites: Kinds and Incorporation
Recently, two solutions were proposed for the case of  indefi nite 
defi nites: semantic incorporation and kind denotation, which are 
classical solutions to bare noun phrases. Carlson (1977) was the fi rst 
to introduce the idea that bare plurals in English denote the kind, and 
van Geenhoven’s (1998) analysis of  Icelandic was seminal in appealing 
to semantic incorporation as a solution to bare nouns. Carlson (2006) 
restricts the idea of  incorporation to bare nouns which are not productive 
in the language. Thus, incorporation cannot be the explanation for bare 
nouns in Chinese, nor for bare plurals in English. It is probably also not 
a solution for the bare singular in Brazilian Portuguese either.6 Let’s see 
these solutions.
6 Bare Singulars in Brazilian Portuguese is a topic in itself. Müller (2002) claims that Bare 
Singulars are incorporated when in object position. Schmitt & Munn (1999) and Pires de Oliveira 
& Rothstein (2011) propose that they are kind denoting terms.
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2.2.1 Semantic Incorporation
Carlson & Sussman (2005) and Carlson et alii (2006) do not present 
a thoroughly worked out solution for the indefi nite defi nite, though they 
sketch such an approach, which is further developed in Carlson et al’s 
paper in this volume. They argue that the indefi nite defi nite shows the 
same properties of  bare singulars in English, as exemplifi ed below:
(17) John is in prison.
Bare singulars are very restricted in English. Moreover, they are 
semantically enriched – (17) conveys that John is a prisoner. They are 
not only lexically restricted, they are also governed by a particular lexical 
item – John is in hospital is not grammatical and John is in front of  the prison 
is not semantically enriched. Like the indefi nite defi nite, bare singulars 
cannot be modifi ed – John is in a big prison does not mean that he is a 
prisoner –, and they do not combine with there-constructions; fi nally, 
they show sloppy identity in elliptical constructions.
The authors conclude that the indefi nite defi nite should be treated 
the same way as the bare singular, which amounts to say that the defi nite 
article in the weak defi nite does not act in the same way as when it 
is in a defi nite description, though it may have the same semantics. In 
the paper in this volume, Carlson et alii clarify the role of  the defi nite 
determiner, and the semantic structure of  the weak defi nite. 
‘Weak’ defi nites should in fact not be subsumed 
under a more general semantic treatment, but form a 
distinguished class of  (apparent) defi nite descriptions 
on their own that shares a semantics with (at least) bare 
count singulars, and probably not with defi nites. (Carlson 
et alii, 2006: 179)
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Thus, weak defi nites behave like bare singulars, and the same semantic 
account should be given for both constructions. The literature on bare 
singulars, in languages where the bare singular is lexically restricted 
(Spanish and Romanian, for instance)7, claims that they are semantically 
incorporated. “Weak defi nite NPs function exactly like bare singulars. 
They show all the earmarks of  semantic incorporation.” (Carlson, 2006: 8)
Semantic incorporation was designed to account for cases where 
the noun phrase is restricted, lacks some of  its usual features (has no 
overt determiner, or no case morphology, for instance), and gives rise 
to an “enriched meaning”.8 Lazaridou-Chatzigoga & Alexandropoulou 
in their paper on Greek bare nouns discuss semantic incorporation 
in more detail. Roughly speaking, a semantically incorporated noun 
denotes a property which is combined with the property denoted by 
the verb, engendering a compound predicate. Thus, in (7.a), Maria went 
to the store, the store is not in fact an argument of  the predicate to go to, and 
it does not refer to an individual, it is rather a predicate that combines 
with the predicate to go to and generates a different predicate which has a 
particular meaning: to go to + the store = to go shopping. 
But why does English need the defi nite article in the examples in (7)? 
Why the bare singular is not used in these constructions? What is exactly 
the role of  the defi nite article in incorporation? These are questions 
that are clarifi ed in the paper in this volume. In principle, this approach 
cannot explain the cases of  possessive defi nites.
2.2.2 Kind reference
Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2011) also deal with the examples of  the 
indefi nite defi nite, and their paper in this volume presents their approach 
7 For an account of  bare singulars in Spanish, Catalan and Romanian see Dobrovie-Sorin et alii 
(2006). For bare singulars in Romance languages see Dobrovie-Sorin & Laca (2003).
8 See Farkas & de Swart (2003), Dayal (2011) for detailed presentations of  incorporation.
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in detail. They argue that weak defi nite phrases do not denote specifi c 
objects, but instantiations of  specifi c kinds. It is certainly the case that 
the defi nite determiner has to denote the kind as in the dodo is extinct; 
the so called defi nite generic. Thus, in their approach, uniqueness is 
preserved at the kind-level: the defi nite determiner denotes a particular 
and unique kind. In a nutshell, Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts propose 
that store in (7.a), Mary went to the store, denotes the kind store. Their 
analysis relies on Dayal’s (2004) proposal that in the lexicon nouns are 
ambiguous between denoting a set of  individuals (=object level) and 
kind interpretations. Thus, the lexicon is sorted out into individuals and 
kinds. Moreover, they propose a “usage” predicate U that denotes the 
set of  all the stereotypical events associated with a particular noun. U (e, 
storek) gives us the stereotypical events related to the kind store, i.e. the 
enriched meaning of  going shop. The U predicate explains why the weak 
reading only happens with some nouns: not all nouns have stereotypical 
usages. The kind noun storek is then instantiated into the individual (object 
level) stores, but since the instantiations are not existentially closed, they 
can explain the lack of  uniqueness for the instantiations. Thus, (7.a) is 
paraphrased as: There is an event whose agent is Mary and this is an 
event that involves the kind store as theme and the stereotypical events 
in which the kind store is involved, and this kind has instantiations. As a 
result, uniqueness is just for the kind. 
But now we have lost the relation with the bare singulars in English, 
unless we also want to say that the bare singular denotes the kind. 
Moreover, it is unclear how this analysis could be applied to the relational 
weak defi nites. Finally, this approach predicts that the defi nite generics 
and the weak defi nites have the same behavior.
2.3  Unifi ed treatments?
In the previous analyses, the authors make clear that their aim is 
not a unifi ed account of  both the relational defi nite and the indefi nite 
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defi nite. Though both types of  examples are called weak defi nite, 
perhaps because they share the property of  lacking the presupposition 
of  uniqueness, they may constitute different phenomena. 
There are at least two proposals for a unifi ed solution, both relying 
on weak familiarity9 and aiming at a unifi ed semantics for the defi nite 
article: Beyssade (in this volume) proposes that the nouns in the weak 
reading denote types (intensional entities), her account explores the idea 
of  enriching the ontology, as already found in Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts; 
Corblin (in press) understands that all examples of  weak defi nite are 
cases of  relational defi nites, thus extending the relational solution to all 
cases. He understands that all weak defi nites are relational nouns, which 
are turned into a function the denotation of  which is a single individual. 
However, as already mentioned, it is unclear that the relational defi nites 
refer to a single individual. Both Poesio and Barker argue that this is not 
the case. Moreover, Roberts (2003) explicitly claims that her approach 
cannot deal with relational weak defi nites precisely because they do not 
refer uniquely. As explicitly discussed in several papers by Carlson and by 
Carlson et alii (in this volume), indefi nite defi nites do not refer uniquely, 
as the train example shows. Moreover, it is unclear that nouns such as 
train are relational. If  train is a relational noun, then, we expect car to be 
relational too, and if  it is, then we expect it to have a weak reading, but 
(18) has no such reading:
(18) John came with the car.
The idea of  a different entity to which the weak defi nite refers seems 
to be more promising, but it also faces several challenges, as we will see 
in the next section, when we discuss Beyssade’s proposal. 
9 Weak familiarity has received different defi nitions in the literature. Roughly the idea is that 
familiarity is licensed when the discourse referent is jut entailed by the context. See Roberts 
(2003) for details and Donazzan in this volume.
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None of  these explanations can account for the example of  
extraordinary reading in (13), which may be an indication that this is a 
different phenomenon.
3 The papers in this issue
The papers presented during the conference dealt with topics 
directly raised by weak defi niteness: the three papers given in Portuguese 
translation in this issue are theoretical approaches to weak defi nites. 
Carlson et al’s paper, “Defi nidos fracos, uma forma de defi nitude: 
investigações empíricas”, discusses the results of  different experiments. 
It shows that the normal defi nite description and the weak defi nite 
behave differently since only the weak defi nite denotes non-uniquely; 
moreover speakers interpret the weak defi nite as semantically enriched, 
and fi nally speakers interpret differently a weak defi nite and a weak 
indefi nite – an indefi nite phrase with a noun that raises weak readings 
when combined with a defi nite article. Thus, the defi nite article in a 
weak defi nite is not an expletive. Though the paper is mostly about the 
results of  the experiments, which indeed call for an explanation, it also 
develops the authors’ theoretical explanation. Their main claim is that 
the issue is not so much about choosing between incorporation or kind 
analysis – suggesting that the noun in the weak defi nite may be kind 
denoting -, but about the role of  the defi nite article. Aguilar-Guevara & 
Zwarts adopt the traditional view on the defi nite article, it presupposes 
familiarity and uniqueness, i.e. it denotes a particular individual. Carlson 
and his collaborators claim that the semantic composition of  the weak 
defi nite is not the same as that of  the normal defi nite, which applies to 
the noun directly and returns the only individual who has that property. 
In the weak defi nite, the semantic structure is as below:
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(19) a. DEF (V (N))
b. the (read’ (book’))
The defi nite article combines with a VP, and it conveys the 
understanding that the situation denoted by the VP is familiar, in 
accordance with the results of  the last experiment. No doubt there is a 
lot to be developed.
In “Defi nidos fracos denotam a espécie”, Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts 
discuss in detail their approach to weak defi nites. They claim that the 
weak defi nite and the generic defi nite share the same structure in the 
sense that in both the noun denotes a kind. Weak defi nites normally 
appear in the internal position, whereas the defi nite generic seems to 
be more natural in the external position. There are, however, a number 
of  issues that this proposal raises. Though the authors claim that the 
noun denotes a kind, they adopt some sort of  incorporation to avoid 
the existential closure of  the instantiations of  the kind which would 
allow for anaphora. But, why should there be instantiation of  the kind? 
If  there were instantiations of  the kind, we would expect the sentence 
in (20) to have an existential interpretation, paraphrased as “some horses 
entered in America with the Spanish Colonization. But (20) does not 
have such an interpretation:
(20) The horse entered in America with the Spanish Colonization.
Moreover, we have weak referentiality with the defi nite generic, as 
show in (21), but no semantic enrichment:
(21) John photographed the lion for the fi rst time in his life and so 
did Mary.
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Would there be the same mechanism to avoid access to the 
instantiations? How do we explain that there is no semantic enrichment 
when we have a defi nite generic? Finally, how do they explain the fact 
that anaphora with the kind is not possible:
(22) John went to the hospital, and Mary did too. ??It is a place to 
recover.
Beyssade in “Reabilitando a pressuposição de unicidade” introduces 
a new class of  weak defi nites, as exemplifi ed in (23), and presents 
her hypothesis that weak defi nites refer to types, not tokens, and that 
the defi nite article carries a presupposition of  existence from which 
uniqueness is derived:
(23) Jean s’est cassé le bras / la jambe / le doigt.
Jean Refl  broke the arm / the leg / the fi nger
‘Jean broke his arm / leg / fi nger’
It is interesting to notice that some of  her examples of  body parts 
work in Brazilian Portuguese – for instance, lavar o braço (wash the arm), 
which is not allowed in French. Types are intensional entities, that denote 
singletons in a taxonomic structure – taxonomic structures, according to 
the author, are not lattice structures, a point that need clarifi cation –, 
and the members of  which are indistinguishable. Thus, though a type 
is related to its tokens, which are unique, they are also indistinguishable. 
According to this approach, when a type denotation is involved the 
distinction between defi nite and indefi nite is erased in the sense that 
using one or the other gives the same truth conditions. However, this is 
a prediction that is not verifi ed by the experiments presented in Carlson 
et alii (this volume). Their last experiment shows that speakers interpret 
differently a weak defi nite and a weak indefi nite. Moreover, it is unclear 
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why only certain nouns can denote the type, since all nouns should have, 
at least in principle, a type denotation. Thus, it is diffi cult to explain why 
read the newspaper raises a weak reading, but read the maganize does not, 
unless that is lexically marked. Moreover, there is no obvious way of  
deriving the enriched meanings, except by stipulation. Finally, according 
to her, if  ‘the NP’ denotes more than one N, then the nominal phrase 
does not denote a token. Thus, by inference it denotes a type. However, 
there are two cases of  presuppositional failure: if  there are no individuals, 
or if  there are more than one individual. How are we to differentiate this 
last case from the type reading? 
The other papers in this volume are organized concentrically from 
the weak defi nite core. Donazzan analyses cases of  weak defi nites in 
Italian and argues for a non-ambiguity semantics for the strong and the 
weak defi nites, relying on Roberts’ notion of  weak familiarity. She shows 
that there is a class of  weak defi nites in Italian, but more importantly 
some of  the examples do not engender enriched meanings, though they 
are characterized by prototypicality, that is, they are lexically restricted:
(24) Esco   a   bere  il    caffè   al       bar. (example (14))
 I-go out to drink the coffee at-the bar
 ‘I’m going out to have a coffee at the bar.’
Though (24) is prototypical because the weak reading only happens 
with caffè (coffee), it shows no semantic enrichment. Thus, semantic 
enrichment is not a necessary feature of  weak defi nites. Donazzan 
explores Roberts’ idea of  weak familiarity to claim that in all cases 
uniqueness is preserved. As we have already mentioned, that may not 
be the case; weak defi nites do not seem to refer uniquely, as Roberts 
herself  makes clear in her paper with respect to the relational defi nites; 
but even if  we restrict the analysis to the indefi nite defi nite it is not clear 
that uniqueness is preserved (at least at the object level). 
Basso & Vogt look at the issue of  weak defi niteness from a very 
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original point of  view: demonstratives. The authors wonder whether 
there are weak demonstratives; i.e. demonstratives which lack uniqueness, 
in the sense that they may be truthfully used in a situation to denote 
more than one individual. They come up with examples such as:
(25) John went to this doctor, and Mary did too. (pointing to one 
specialty in a list of  medical specialties)
They show that the weak demonstrative passes the sloppy reading 
test, since John and Mary may have gone to different doctors of  the 
same specialty. They also carry enriched meanings: John and Mary 
want medical treatments. Besides being a clear presentation of  Aguilar-
Guevara & Zwarts kind proposal, their paper turns out to be an argument 
in favor of  this analysis, since they show that the only possibility for (25) 
is to interpret the demonstrative as a sub-kind (a specialty). The fact 
that the demonstrative cannot refer to the maximal entity is one of  its 
characteristic; the relevant point is that this non maximal entity has to be 
a sub-kind. It is unclear whether we need the kind theory to explain this 
data, although it certainly shows that the N in a weak construction seems 
to denote a kind. Carlson & Sussman (2005), Carlson et alii (2006), and 
Carlson et alii (in this volume) anchor their theoretical claims about the 
weak defi nites on psycholinguistic experiments. Zielke investigates the 
behavior of  second language learners of  European Spanish, by speakers 
of  Turkish and German, with respect to the so called “extremely 
reading”, which was introduced in the literature by Lyons (1999). In (26), 
we have an example of  the extremely reading in Spanish: 
(26) En esta librería         hay          los  mejores libros.
in this   book store   there-are the  best       books.
‘In this book store there are the best books.’
Weak Definites and Referentiality
32
The interest of  the paper lies on the fact Turkish has no defi nite 
determiner, thus there is no formal distinction between the defi nite and 
the indefi nite versions of  the there-construction. The hypothesis was, 
then, that Turkish learners would have more diffi culties interpreting 
the Spanish extremely reading examples then German learners. This 
hypothesis was not confi rmed. In fact, both German and Turkish 
speakers had diffi culties with the extremely reading. It is unclear whether 
the extremely reading belongs to the class of  weak defi nites. As shown on 
table 1 above, the extremely reading presupposes uniqueness, though not 
familiarity. Thus, we need a better understanding of  this phenomenon.
Semantic incorporation is commonly invoked as the explanation 
for bare nouns, in particular their role in languages where their use is 
restricted. One of  the main features of  semantic incorporation is number 
neutrality, which, in Carlson’s model explains the lack of  uniqueness of  
the weak defi nite. Relying on an extensive and original investigation 
of  both oral and written corpora in Greek, Lazaridou-Chatzigoga & 
Alexandropoulou investigate bare singulars in this language to conclude, 
going against the strict view on incorporation, that they are not number 
neutral, but singular (in accordance with Dayal’s recent (2011) analysis of  
Hindi), and that they are arguments – classically, incorporated nominal 
phrases are considered referentially weak. Here is an example from their 
corpora that supports their claim against number neutrality: 
(27) Ehi  ghamo  sto     dhiplano horio.  #Enan 
has wedding in.the next       village    one 
stin    eklisia  ke   enan sto    dhimarhio.
in.the church and one in.the town.hall
‘There is a wedding in the next village. One is in the
church and one in the town hall.’
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If  ghamo (wedding) were number neutral, the sequence should be 
acceptable, but it is not. Relying on the empirical support of  their corpus 
analysis, their paper challenges the strict view of  incorporation, a major 
theoretical contribution. The challenge is to explain how bare singulars 
can be at the same time arguments and semantically incorporated.
Lee’s paper investigates the distinction between defi nite and 
indefi nite noun phrases, looking at numeral noun phrases in Korean. 
Korean is a classifi er language and the numeral may occupy two different 
positions: the noun may precede a numeral classifi er consisting of  a 
numeral expression and a classifi er as in (28.a); or the noun may appear 
after a numeral classifi er with a genitive marker, (28.b): 
(28) a. [haksyang [sye meyng]]-i o-ass-ta. 
student  3 Cl-Nom come-Past-Decl
b. [[sye meyng]-uy haksyang]-i  o-ass-ta. 
 3 Cl-Gen student-Nom  come-Past-Decl
 ‘Three students came.’
Traditionally these different number constructions were associated 
with defi nite and indefi nite readings, respectively. The author shows that 
this is not the case, though both appear in there-construction. The post 
numeral classifi er construction, where the numeral appears after the 
noun, may receive defi nite and indefi nite interpretations; whereas the 
pre numeral classifi er construction is defi nite.
The last paper is Foltran & Rodrigues’ discussion about the syntax-
semantic of  copular clauses in Brazilian Portuguese in which the 
predicate exhibits the unmarked form for gender and number, in spite 
of  the feminine and feminine plural forms of  subjects: 
(29) a. Maria bêbada é chato.
  Maria drunk-fem is boring-Neutral
 b. Crianças é divertido.
  Children is funny-Neutral
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The authors argue that in (29) we have two different structures: 
(29.a) is a small clause, the subject of  which is a situation, which asks 
for a neutral agreement; whereas in (29.b) the subject is a DP which 
lacks the agreement features. They contribute to the discussion because 
structures like (29.b) must be indefi nite.
Conclusion
The notion of  weak defi nites is not self  evident as the examples 
discussed in the papers during the conference clearly testify. One of  
the goals of  the conference was precisely to clarify this notion, as a fi rst 
step towards evaluating the best theoretical description. The topic of  
weak defi nites, and its relation to weak referentiality, is a fairly recent 
one and that is why some of  the basic questions are still open, the most 
important of  them being the possibility of  unifying theoretically all the 
structures and examples discussed in the papers of  this volume. 
The only feature that apparently unifi es all the examples that 
constitute the so-called “weak defi nites” is, from a descriptive point of  
view, the lack of  the presupposition of  uniqueness in the use of  a defi nite 
description, except from the “extremely reading”, which lacks familiarity. 
But notice that some proposals – Corblin (in press) and Donazzan (this 
volume) – rescue the idea of  uniqueness. So, what exactly characterizes 
the weak defi nite? Probably, the answer to this question leads to a unifi ed 
or a non-unifi ed theory of  weak defi nites, and we hope that the papers 
here collected illuminate the search for such answers. 
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